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Summary findings
To examine whether a country's  exchange rate regime  Switching from a floating regime to an intermediate
has any impact on inflation and growth performance in  regime might not reduce inflation.
transition economies, Doma,,  Peters, and Yuzefovich  *  An unanticipated float-when  a country whose
develop an empirical framework that addresses some of  fundamentals make it unlikely to adopt  another regime
the main problems plaguing empirical work in this strand  adopts a floating regime-results  in lower inflation.
of the literature: the Lucas critique, the endogeneity of  Based on their results, it is not possible to infer more
the exchange rate regime, and the sample selection  about one particular exchange rate regime being superior
problem.  to another  in terms of growth performance. But
Empirical results demonstrate that the exchange rate  empirical findings do underscore the different effects
regime does affect inflation performance. The results  that policy variables-and  other variables influencing
suggest that:  economic activity-have  on growth under different
Transition countries with intermediate arrangements  exchange-rate arrangements.
might reduce inflation if they were to adopt a fixed
regime.
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21. Introduction
The  issue of  the  appropriateness of  exchange rate arrangements has  returned to  the
forefront as a result of the recent crises in Asia, Russia, Brazil, and more recently economic
developments  in Argentina. More precisely, the debate over fixed and flexible exchange regimes
has once again taken center stage.  Some claimed that the first round of this debate was won by
those advocating flexible regimes: all crisis episodes took place in countries which had adopted a
variety of mechanisms for pegging more or less closely to the dollar.'  Fixed exchange rates, soft
pegs in particular, were blamed for the recent financial meltdowns. 2 The advocates of fixed
exchange regime, however, have asserted that there are bad fixes and good fixes: a good fix is,
for  example, full  dollarization [Calvo (1999), Hanke  and  Schuller  (1999)].  Clearly, this
controversy, which has raged in the economic literature for more than a  century, continues
unabated.
An important recent development in the debate over most appropriate best exchange rate
arrangement is  the recognition that the choice of  the exchange rate  regime for  developing
countries is different from that of developed countries. 3 Developing countries are often beset by
a  lack of  credibility and  limited  access to  international markets;  they  are beset by  more
pronounced adverse effects of exchange rate volatility on trade, high liability dollarization, and
higher passthrough from the exchange rate to inflation.  Consequently, benign neglect of the
exchange rate is not a feasible option for developing countries.
Admittedly, empirical corroboration of the arguments set forth in the literature has been
the least explored part of this debate.  Contrary to the large number of theoretical and conceptual
discussions, relatively few  studies have made an attempt to  investigate empirically the link
lSee  Calvo (1999) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
2 See, for instance, Goldstein (1999).
3between macroeconomic performance and the exchange rate regime.  This is, perhaps, because
such an empirical investigation is fraught with difficulties, including the problem concerning the
classification of the exchange regime.4
In spite of the growing interest over the link between the  exchange rate  regime and
macroeconomic performance, the burgeoning empirical literature on transition economies has
paid little attention to this issue. 5 It has largely focused on recovery and growth as well as price
liberalization and inflation. 6 Some of the existing studies made an attempt to incorporate only
the effect of the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime on inflation and growth with mainly
two objectives in mind: (i) to capture favorable confidence effects of nominal exchange rate
anchors on velocity; and (ii) to account for the output costs of stabilization associated with the
adoption of a particular nominal anchor, namely the exchange rate.  Nevertheless, none of the
studies made an attempt to investigate explicitly the links between the nominal exchange rate
regime and macroeconomic  performance.
This paper aims to fill this void by investigating empirically the link between the exchange
rate regime and macroeconomic performance in transition economies. 7 To this end, we develop
an empirical framework that addresses some of the main problems plaguing empirical work in
this strand of the literature, namely the Lucas critique, endogeneity of the exchange rate regime,
3 Calvo (1999) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000a, 2000b)
4 See, for instance, Ghosh et  al (1997), Baxter and Stockman (1989), and Edwards and Savastano (1999) for  a review of
problems encountered  by empirical studies in this literature.
Studies by Dombusch (1994) and by Sachs (1996) are among the few papers focusing on the macroeconomic implications of
the exchange rate regime and on the choice of the exchange rate in the transition countries. More recently, series of papers-
presented at an  Association for  Comparative Economic Studies panel entitled "Exchange Rate  Policies in Transition", in
Chicago, January 4,  1998-made  an attempt to explore issues related to exchange rate regime in the countries in Transition.
Majority of the papers were descriptive in their nature and made no attempt to empirically investigate the macroeconomic
implications of the exchange  rate regime in transition economies.
6 See, for instance, Berg et al. (1999), Hemnandez-Cata  (1999), Christoffersen and Doyle (1998), Fischer et al. (1998, 2000), and
Havrylyshyn et al. (1998).
7 This study will not explore issues related to monetary and exchange rate policy encountered by countries negotiating EU
accession-Czech  Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.  See Corker et al (2000) and Masson (1999) for a detailed
discussion of these issues.
4and the sample selection problem.8  More specifically, we utilize a switching regression model
which is estimated using a two-step Heckman procedure.  First, we estimate the equation for the
choice of the exchange rate regime by using ordered probit.  Second, we utilize a switching
regression technique to investigate whether the exchange rate regime has a bearing on inflation
and growth performance in transition economies.
When tackling this controversial  topic in the context of transition economies, however, two
issues emerge.  First, it is important to make a distinction between the appropriateness of the
exchange rate arrangements in the earlier phase of the transition process-money  vs. exchange
rate based stabilization debate-and  the appropriateness of the exchange rate arrangements (in
the aftermath of the stabilization) for long-run economic management.  Second, one needs to
clarify whether the same economic principles of exchange rate policy apply both to market
economies and transition economies.  Put differently, are transition economies so unique that
what characterizes  market economies or developing countries has little relevance to them?
The first issue, though beyond the scope of this investigation, will be discussed briefly by
looking at  some  stylized  facts about the performance of  transition  countries that  adopted
different anchors in their stabilization programs.9  In the case of the second issue, the paper,
while conceding that  transition economies have distinct features-such  as extreme forms of
central planning which  meant price  controls, chronic excess  demand, and  forced saving-
compared to other developing countries, will proceed under the assumption that the fundamental
tenets of  exchange rate  policy apply to  any  and all  types  economies [Guitian (1994) and
8 The Lucas critigue states that when there is a policy switch the coefficients associated with policy variables should change.
This is because the way in which expectations are formed-the  relationship of expectations to past information-changes  when
the behavior of forecasted variables changes.  The sample selection problem arises from the fact that countries do not choose
their  exchange rate  regimes randomly.  Instead,  their  choice  hinges  on a  set  of  fundamentals, which,  in  tum,  affects
macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation and growth.  Consequently,  the use of standard econometric techniques such as OLS
or 2SLS will produce biased results stemming from the correlation between the regime choice and the error term in either the
inflation or growth equation.
5Dombusch  (1994)1.10  The  investigation,  however,  will  attempt  to  make  the  necessary
modifications to account for the distinct characteristics  of transition economies, where possible.
The principal conclusions that emerge from our study are:
1.  Transition economies that: (i) have lower budget deficits; (ii) are more open (i.e. have a
higher ratio of exports plus imports to GDP); and (iii) made more progress in private sector
entry and internal markets tend to adopt more stringent exchange rate regimes.  While the
results suggest that those which have made more progress in opening to external markets and
with a  reserves to  monetary base ratio  above 1.34 opt  for more flexible exchange rate
arrangements.
2.  The exchange rate regime does make a difference for inflation performance.  The findings
imply that countries with intermediate arrangements  may achieve lower inflation if they were
to adopt a fixed regime.  The results also suggest that switching from a floating regime to an
intermediate arrangement may not deliver lower inflation since their fimdamentals may be
inappropriate for an intermediate regime.  However, when a country with an intermediate
regime switches to a floating regime, it experiences higher inflation.
3.  The results also suggest that the case of an unanticipated float-a  situation describing a
country where fundamentals make it likely to adopt another regime, but it adopts a floating
regime-results  in lower inflation.
4.  Based our empirical results, however, it  is not possible to  make  any inference about a
particular exchange rate regime being superior to the other in terms of growth performance.
Nonetheless, empirical findings  suggest that  policy variables-and  also  other  variables
9In  Appendix 1,  we try to highlight some stylized facts from the stabilization performance of transition countries under different
anchors.
10This  conjecture, however, does not imply that the working of a particular exchange rate policy or arrangement is independent  of
the characteristic of the economy in which it is being pursued.
6influencing economic activity-do  have  a  different  impact  on  growth  under  different
exchange rate arrangements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the overall trend
in the evolution of the exchange rate regimes both in general and in the context of transition
economies in the 1990s. Section 3 provides a brief review of the literature focusing on the link
between exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic performance. Section 4 takes a cursory look
at  the  evolution of  key  macroeconomic variables  in  transition  economies  under  different
exchange rate arrangements. Section 5 describes the empirical framework.  Section 6 reports
empirical findings. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. A Brief Overview of the Evolution of the Exchange Rate Regimes in the 1990s
Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early
1970s, there has been a gradual shift from fixed to more flexible exchange rates. Initially, many
developing countries pegged their currencies either to a single currency (usually the USD or FF)
or to a basket of currencies. By the late 1970s, they began to shift from single currency pegs to
basket pegs.  In the early 1980s, developing countries shifted away from currency pegs towards
more flexible exchange rate arrangements."
A glance at the evolution of the exchange rate regimes of developing countries and of the
transition economies during the  1990s reveals an  interesting trend (Figure  1).  Since 1994,
developing,  including  transition,  countries  appear  to  have  shifted  away  from  fixed  and
independent floating exchange rate regimes towards intermediate flexibility.
"  i  In 1975, for example, 87 percent of developing countries had some type of pegged exchange rate. By 1996, this proportion had
declined to well below 50 percent. When the relative size of economies is taken into consideration, the shift is even more
pronounced. In 1975, countries with pegged rates accounted for 70 percent of the developing world's total trade; by 1996, this
figure had dropped to about 20 percent.
7Transition countries have adopted a broad variety of different exchange rate regimes.' 2 A
large number of countries, from the outset, let their currencies float while maintaining some
scope for intervention [Albania (1992), Bulgaria (1991), Romania (1993), and Slovenia (1992)
as well as several CIS republics].  Some countries, on the other hand, opted for a fixed regime
from the outset [Croatia (1993), Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, Poland
until 1991, and Macedonia (1994)]; three chose the extreme of a currency board (Estonia and
later Lithuania as well as Bulgaria).  Other countries decided to purse a more flexible approach
and introduced a crawling peg system (Poland from October 1991, Hungary from March 1995)
or a fixed but adjustable peg (Hungary until 1995).
Not surprisingly, the appropriate exchange rate regime for transition economies-both  in
the case of the initial phase of reform and more advance stage of economic transformation-has
stimulated much debate.  A recent statement by Vaclav Klaus (1997) on this particular issue is
quite telling:
The collapse of communism  "happened" in the moment when the economic
profession  believed in fixed exchange  rates and in the advantage of anchoring  the
economy  by means  of one fixed  point-especially in a situation  when all other  variables
undergo  large changes  and fluctuations.  I have  to confess  that I was originally  afraid  of
introducing  such a rigid regime but the first impressions  were positive because we
succeeded  in choosing  an exchange  rate which functioned  well for a very long seventy-
six moths. By sufficiently  devaluing  the crown on the eve of price liberalization  we
formed  something  what I later called  the "transformation  cushion". The exchange  rate
cushion (as well as the parallel wage cushion) appeared  to be crucial for the whole
subsequent  transformation  process. The inflation  differential  was, in our case,  not as big
as in some other transforming  countries  but the appreciation  in real terms reached in
seventy-six  months  was  almost  80 percent,  which  was too much. Although  we have  been
constantly  checking  the remaining  thickness  of our exchange  rate cushion,  as we see it
now, we-probably  in the middle of 1996-missed the most suitable  moment for the
abolition  of the fixed exchange  rate regime.  The question  is, however, whether  the
subsequent  movements  of the rate of exchange  rate would  have been less dramatic  than
they  were in reality  in recent  months. The vulnerability  of an emerging  market  economy
is, in this  respect,  very high and,  probably,  unavoidable.
12 See Corker et al (2000) for a more detailed discussion of this issue for selected advanced transition economies.
8In  terms of the  choice of the exchange rate  regime, he  draws a tentative  lesson: "A fixed
exchange regime should not last too long".
Although it may sound trite, the clearest conclusion that has emerged from discussions
over this controversial topic was that the adoption of a particular regime is neither a necessary
nor  a  sufficient condition  for  the realization of  desired macroeconomic outcomes.  More
specifically,  it  is  argued  that  different  exchange  rate  arrangements  can  contribute  to
macroeconomic  stabilization  provided that: (i) the authorities  implement prudent macroeconomic
policies consistent with the exchange rate regime in place; (i) the regime is compatible with intial
macroeconomic conditions of the country; and (iii) the regime is not altered too frequently so
that the necessary credibility can be established. 13
It is interesting to note that the recent trend towards intermediate regimes (see Figure 1) is
in contrast to arguments set forth by some analysts, who assert that the growing integration of
international capital markets over the past two decades requires a clarification of the exchange
rate  regime. 14 They argue that it is  not possible to  have hybrid  solutions endeavoring to
reconcile too many objectives.  One has to opt for fairly free floating exchange rates or very
credibly fixed ones.  In short, they conclude that "middle way" solutions, involving fixed but
adjustable exchange rates have been rendered more unstable by the growth of capital flows.
13 See, for instance, Radzyner and Riesinger (1997).
14 See, for example, Crockett (1997).  However, Fischer (2001) argues that developing countries which are not very exposed to
international capital inflows still encounter a wide range of intermediate options.  Moreover, it should be noted that Figure I
presents the developments up to 1998. As was shown in Fischer (2001), there was a notable decline in the number of countries
with intermediate regimes in 1999.
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Hungary, Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic,Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia,  Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,  and Ukraine.
This view, however, does not enjoy unanimous support.  Specifically, it is argued that
there are  good  reasons for  many countries  to  adopt intermediate regimes  in  spite  of the
substantial increase in capital mobility.  Proponents of intermediate arrangements contend that
presence of a number of safety valves can make such regimes viable, in particular if they are
adopted in the context of a broader economic and political integration process. 15 They argue that
corner solutions tend to be the exception rather than the rule for many countries: currency boards
entail very demanding preconditions to be viable, while flexible  exchange rate arrangements
tend to have considerable disadvantages  for small-open economies.
15  See, for instance, Backe (1999).
10Recent developments in the international monetary and financial environment have had a
significant impact on the evolution of exchange rate regimes in at least three aspects." 6 First,
recent advances in telecommunications and information technology have reduced transactions
cost  in  financial markets  and  prompted both  financial innovations and  liberalization  and
deregulation of domestic and international transactions.  As a consequence, there has been a
sharp increase in capital mobility. The noticeable expansion of both gross and net capital flows
between developed and emerging markets is a case in point.  Balance of payments statistics
demonstrate that net annual inflows into emerging economies increased from virtually zero in
1989 to reach $307 billion in 1996,  before declining to about half that level in 1997 and 1998.17
Second, the increasing integration of emerging market economies into the world economy
has enabled them to enjoy the benefits of globalization. At the same time, however, made these
countries more susceptible to  sudden reversal in  capital flows.  Private capital flows have
emerged as one of the most  important elements of adjustment and financing mechanisms in
emerging economies.
Finally, the launch of the Euro  marks the creation of  a multi-polar currency system,
moving away from dependence on the dollar as the dominant currency of the system.  This
development has important implications for the system as to whether the exchange rate between
major currencies will continue  to undergo  large fluctuations as occurred in  the  1980s and
1990s.1 8 Indeed, evidence to date-i.e.  the evolution of the Euro vis a vis the dollar-appears  to
suggest that such oscillations between major currencies are likely to resume in the future as well.
16  IMF (2000).
17 See HF (1998).
8 For instance, the appreciation of the dollar against the yen prior to the Asian crisis was considered as one of the contributing
factors to the crisis since the exchange rate in most of the crisis countries was rigidly pegged either to the dollar or a basket
dominated  by the dollar.
11The above described developments, to a large extent, contributed to the documented trend
towards greater exchange rate flexibility and subsequent diminution in the use of the exchange
rate to anchor monetary policy.  More specifically, the fact that both developing and transition
countries are more exposed to currency movements compared to developed countries and that
they lack deep financial markets and strong financial institutions suggests that "benign neglect"
of the exchange rate is not a feasible option for them.  Consequently, many developing and
transition countries are, perhaps, inclined to pursue a hybrid arrangement with limited flexibility
to the exchange rate-via  bands or other limits on fluctuations against some other currency or
currencies-but  without the rigidity embedded in currency pegs.
3. The Relationship between Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes and Economic Performance:
A Brief Review of the Literature
Orthodox discussion of the choice between fixed and flexible regimes hinges on the nature
of  the  shocks.' 9 Standard models  imply that  floating rates  will  be  advantageous  when
disturbances are primarily monetary and foreign, since in this case exchange rate changes can
largely insulate the domestic economy. Pegged rates are preferable when shocks are associated
mainly  with  unstable domestic  monetary and  financial policies  as  pegged  rates will  help
discipline erratic policy makers.
Proponents of flexible exchange rates claim that these regimes are more efficient than
fixed  exchange rates  in  correcting balance of  payments disequilibria.  Furthermore, they
underscore that by  allowing a  country to  achieve external balance easily and automatically,
flexible rates facilitate the achievement of internal balance and other economic objectives of the
country.  On the other hand, advocates of fixed exchange rates contend that by introducing a
12degree of uncertainty not present under fixed rates, flexible exchange rates decrease the volume
of international trade and investment, are more likely to lead destabilizing speculation, and are
inflationary.
Furthermore, one of the main appealing features of floating exchange rates-the  ability to
absorb shocks-has  recently been challenged. It is argued that countries with flexible exchange
rates-except  those with well-developed and sophisticated markets-are  likely to experience a
surge in the volatility of the real value of domestic assets due to increased capital mobility.
Excessive fluctuations in the real value of domestic assets may, in turn, undermine stability
[Cooper (1999)].
The modern literature-also  considering the extreme arrangements of flexible and fixed
regimes-places  great emphasis on the presence of important trade-offs between credibility and
flexibility. 20 A floating regime enables a country to have an independent monetary policy so that
the economy can accommodate domestic and foreign shocks such as changes in terms of trade
and interest rates.  However, this flexibility is achieved at the cost of some loss in credibility
which, in turn, tends to be associated with higher inflation. Fixed exchange rates, on the other
hand, reduce the degree of flexibility but bring a higher degree of credibility to policy making.
Since, under fixed rates, agents believe that the primary objective of monetary policy is to
maintain the  parity, they moderate their price  and  wage  expectations, thereby  leading the
economy to achieve a lower inflation rate.
A careful review of the theoretical arguments put forth by each side does not lead to any
definitive conclusion that one system is overwhelmingly superior to the other.  For instance,
contrary to the traditional ranking between fixed and floating regimes, which is based on a loss
19 This ranking is based on a loss function that depends on output volatility.
20 See, for instance, Edwards (1996) and Frankel (1995).
13function that depends exclusively on output volatility, Calvo (1999b) shows that fixed exchange
rates would always dominate flexible regimes if the function being optimized places weight on
real exchange rate volatility. 21 Furthermore, since shocks could contain both real and nominal
components in practice, the choice of exchange rate regime on the basis of the nature of shocks
becomes problematic. In fact, recent crises episodes in which shocks have come largely through
the capital account-affecting  both aggregate demand as well as money demand-lend  support
to this conjecture and cast doubts about the usefulness of floating exchange rates as a shock
absorber.
What is the empirical evidence linking inflation and output growth with the exchange rate
regime?  Although some suggestive stylized fact are beginning to emerge, the evidence is still
quite limited.
More specifically, studies that have tried to  ferret out  the influence of  exchange rate
arrangements on economic performance can be grouped under two categories: country specific
studies and  multi-country studies.  Country specific investigations has had  a  difficult time
unraveling the independent effects of the nominal exchange rate  regime on macroeconomic
performance: detection of  regularity associated with  a particular  regime  in  one  study  was
followed by a  counter example in  another study.  Multi-country studies have also  found it
difficult to make generalizations.  For instance, Little et al. (1993) conducted a comprehensive
study covering 18 developing countries.  They found that while  in  some countries a  fixed
exchange rate regime was associated with lower inflation, in other episodes the exchange rate
turned out to be an ineffective nominal anchor.
Edwards (1993) studied whether, ex ante, the exchange rate regime has an  impact on
inflationary performance by introducing financial discipline.  He employed a sample from 52
21 He also shows that this dominance weakens, but does not vanish, with full indexation to the exchange rate.
14countries over the period 1980-89. His results showed that countries with fixed exchange rates
had lower inflation  rates during the 1980s  compared to countries with flexible arrangements.
Tomell  and  Velasco  (1999),  however,  challenged Edwards'  findings  on  theoretical
grounds, pointing out that a depreciating currency is a more immediate and observable signal of
fiscal indiscipline than a decline in reserves that appears with delay and can be concealed. They
found empirical support for their position by examining the behavior of 28 sub-Saharan African
countries.
Ghosh et al. (1997)-one  of the most comprehensive  multi-country studies-examined  the
effects of the nominal  exchange rate regime  on inflation and  growth using data from  136
countries during the period of  1960-89.  They found that both  the  level and variability of
inflation was markedly lower under fixed exchange rates than under floating exchange rates.
However,  their  findings  also  suggest  that  the  inflation  bias  of  flexible  exchange  rate
arrangements does not seem to be present among the pure floaters in the sample-particularly
among the high  and upper middle  income ones.  This  implies that the positive association
between exchange rate flexibility and inflation found in the study may not be monotonic. 2
Their study failed to  find a robust link between growth and currency regimes, probably
because investment ratios are higher but trade growth somewhat lower under fixed than under
floating exchange rates.  However, they found that the variability of real output is noticeably
higher under fixed than under floating exchange rates. 23
Moreover, a recent study by Hausmann et al. (1999) demonstrated that during the 1990s
Latin American countries with fixed exchange rates had greater financial depth-as  measured by
22 It should be noted that this finding seems to contradict the conclusion that Quirk (1994) reached in his review of previous
empirical literature: there is not much linkage between exchange  rate arrangements and inflation.
23  A recent IMF study (1997) extends the period to mid-1990s and reaches similar conclusions.  This implies that findings of
Ghosh et al. (1997) were not greatly influenced by the increased access to international markets enjoyed by developing countries
in the 1990s.
15M2/GDP-lower  interest rates, and  less effective wage indexation than those  with  floating
exchange rates.  Their results also indicated that monetary policy under floating rates has been
more pro-cyclical than under fixed rates. 24
All  in  all,  one  recent  review  of  the  empirical  literature  suggests  that  empirical
investigations in  this  area  suffer from the following problems plaguing  empirical work in
economics: 25
*  Cross-country analyses investigating the inflation performance of countries with different
regimes are potentially subject to a survival bias.  The difficulty is that only countries that
have  succeeded in  defending the  peg  are included  in  the  fixed  exchange  rate  group.
Whereas, countries that adopted a fixed exchange rate, but could not sustain it, are usually
grouped under flexible exchange rate regime category. 26
•  Discrepancies between  declared  and  effective  exchange  rate  arrangements  can  be  an
important source of error.
*  Endogeneity of the choice of the exchange rate regime or reverse causation also constitutes a
major problem in empirical studies. It is not clear whether a fixed exchange rate causes lower
inflation or whether countries with low rates of inflation adopt this kind of arrangement. 27
24 A recent study by Doma9 and Martinez-Peria (2000) investigated the issue at hand from a different aspect by considering the
link between banking crises and the exchange rate regimes.
25  Edwards and Savastano (1999).
26 See Aghevli et al.(1991) for more on this.
27 Indeed, this issues is closely related to the ultimate source of inflation: a fiscal deficit. The need to finance a fiscal deficit leads
to the excessive growth in money supply, which, in turn, causes inflation.  In this context, countries that need to finance a fiscal
deficit using seigniorage will opt for an exchange  rate system consistent with this target-a  flexible exchange rate regime.
164.  Macroeconomic Performance and  the Exchange Rate Regime: Stylized Facts  from
Transition Countries
A wide variety of exchange rate regimes has been adopted in transition countries (Figure 1).
Not only have the regimes been different, but also in some countries they have changed since the
inception of the reforms.  A summary of some stylized facts from three pairs of countries
operating under alternative exchange rate regimes 1991-98 is shown in Table 1, which draws on
the stated commitment of the central bank  (as summarized in  the IMF's  Annual report on
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions). In other words, it uses a dejure
classification based on the publicly stated commitment of the exchange rate instead of a defacto
classification based on the observed behavior of the exchange rate.
Both classifications have their own shortcomings. A defacto classification has the advantage
of being based on observable behavior, but it does not capture the distinction between stable
nominal exchange rates resulting from the absence of shocks, and stability that stems from policy
actions offsetting shocks.  More importantly, it fails to reflect the commitment of the central
bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market.  Although the de jure  classification captures
this formal commitment, it falls short of capturing policies inconsistent with the commitment,
which, in turn, lead to a collapse or frequent adjustments of the parity.
Following  Ghosh  et  al  (1997),  we  classify  exchange  rate  arrangements  into  three
categories: pegged; intermediate; and floating  regimes.
2 8 The pegged regimes include single
currency pegs, SDR pegs, other published basket pegs, and secret baskets.  The intermediate
group contains cooperative systems, unclassified floats, and floats with pre-determined ranges.
Thefloat group comprises of floats without pre-determined range and pure floats.
28 To this end, we draw on the various issues of the IMF's Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions.
17The analysis presented in Table 1 shows that countries with intermediate flexibility had
better growth performance, compared to those that pegged and floated.  In terms of inflation
performance, countries with pegged exchange rates had the lowest inflation, whereas those with
floating rates experienced the highest inflation during the period under  consideration.  Not
surprisingly, countries with floating rates had considerably higher monetary growth compare to
those with fixed or intermediate regimes-an  observation confirming the conventional discipline
argument arising from  the  impact of  fixed regimes on  the  dynamics  of  money creation.
Moreover, countries that pegged or adopted intermediate exchange rate arrangements exhibited
noticeably  betterfi scal discipline compared to those that adopted floating rates.
Countries with fixed exchange rate regime appear to have higher current account deficits
compared to  those  adopting intermediate and flexible regimes.  However, once the  outlier
observation, Azerbaijan (1992), is excluded, countries with flexible exchange rate regimes have
higher current account deficits than those with fixed and intermediate regimes. Finally, countries
with fixed and intermediate regimes have higher ratios of reserves to base money than those with
floating exchange regime.
These are, of course, simple observations without controlling for many relevant factors. It
is, therefore, not possible to conclude how much of the better macroeconomic performance was
in fact due to the particular exchange rate regime adopted and how much was due instead to
other important factors.
Figure 2 provides more detailed information by presenting the evolution of selected key
economic indicators of transition countries operating under alternative exchange rate regimes
over the period 1991-98.
18Table 1. Exchange Rate Regime and Macroeconomic  Performance: Transition Economies
Pegged  Intermediate  Flexibility  Independent Floating
Growth  Performance
Mean  -0.40  0.73  -7.81
Median  3.24  2.30  -8.20
Inflation  Performance
Mean  71.02  228.12  933.70
Median  14.05  19.50  116.00
Inflation  Performance'
Mean  0.20  0.26  0.54
Median  0.12  0.16  0.54
Unemplovment  Performance
Mean  8.97  10.61  9.16
Median  9.65  9.05  8.45
Budeet  Balanceb
Mean  -3.53  -3.55  -9.74
Median  -1.90  -3.10  -7.50
Broad  Money  Growth
Mean  38.85  111.04  286.79
Median  20.40  29.10  92.15
Broad  Money  Growth'
Mean  0.22  0.27  0.50
Median  0.17  0.23  0.48
Current  Account  Deficitb
Mean  -5.21  4.72  -3.86
Median  -5.02  4.40  -7.70
Reserves  to Base Money
Mean  1.03  1.13  0.73
Median  1.13  0.98  0.60
Source:  EBRD,  IMF,  WB,  and authors'  calculations.
Note:  The sample,  over  the period  of 1991-98,  consists  of Albania,  Arnenia, Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,
Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Georgia,  Hungary,  Kazakstan,  Kyrgyz  Republic,Latvia,  Lithuania,  Macedonia,  Moldova,
Poland,  Romania,  Russia,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,  and  Ukraine.
a: To reduce  the importance  of outliers,  the inflation  rate (it) is transformed  to: n/(1+it).  Clearly,  as  X- oo, the
inflation  rate  will approach  to 1.
b:Asa%ofGDP
c: Similar  transformation  to reduce the irnportance  of outliers  for inflation  is also performed  for broad money
growth.
19Figure 2. Exchange Rate Regime and Macroeconomic Performance:  Transition Economies
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21From this analysis, one can identify at least five key patterns from the behavior of the
macroeconomic variables in question. First, countries with intermediate regimes appear to have
experienced smaller contractions of output and faster recovery.  Second, the lowest inflation
throughout the period under consideration  is observed in countries operating under fixed regime.
However, the difference between inflation under floating and intermediate regimes tapers off
overtime.
Third,  countries with  floating  regimes  clearly experience  the  highest  budget deficit
compared to those operating under fixed or intermediate regimes.  The fiscal performance of
countries with  fixed regimes, however, is not noticeably better that those  with intermediate
regimes.  It is interesting to note that the relatively poor fiscal performance of countries with
flexible regime arises from weak revenue collection not from excessive spending. This could be
due to the so called "reverse Tanzi effect" arising from increases in tax collection caused by
immediately stabilizing prices-a  phenomenon observed  in  successful  exchange-rate based
stabilization programs.
Fourth, contrary to the experience of other emerging markets where the current account
deficit tends to be higher in countries with more stringent exchange regimes, it appears that, in
the case of transition economies, countries with floating regimes experience, on average, higher
current account deficits.  Finally, it appears that the ratio of international reserves to monetary
base  tends  to  be  somewhat lower in  floating countries, though the  difference is not  very
significant.
225. The Empirical Framework
It may be possible to underpin some of these stylized facts from a  cursory look at the
evolution of selected key economic indicators under alternative regimes.  However, it is not
possible to identify the independent effects of the nominal exchange rate regime on economic
performance without a thorough analysis in which macroeconomic/financial fundamentals and
institutional  arrangements-affecting  both  economic  performance  and  the  choice  of  the
exchange rate regime-are  controlled for.
In  an attempt to  examine the  impact of the  exchange rate regime on macroeconomic
performance, empirical studies often employ exchange rate dummies in reduced form equations
for inflation and growth.  The coefficient estimate of a particular exchange regime dummy is, in
turn, deemed to reveal the effect of the exchange rate arrangement on the dependent variable.
One of  the major drawbacks of this approach is that at the time of  the regime  switch the
coefficients associated with  policy variables also change-a  phenomenon referred to as  the
Lucas critique.  One approach to avoid this problem is to estimate each equation representing
different exchange rate regimes separately and then to test for the equality of coefficients. This
approach, however, would fail to capture the causal link between macroeconomic fundamentals
and the exchange rate regime-the  ability of  an economy and also policymakers'  desire to
implement certain exchange rate regimes under given fundamentals.
Moreover, existing studies, to the best of our knowledge, fail to address the issue of the
sample selection problem.  The sample selection problem arises from the fact that countries do
not choose their exchange rate regimes randomly.  Instead, their  choice hinges on  a  set of
fundamentals, which, in turn, affects macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation and growth.
Consequently, the use of standard econometric techniques such as OLS or 2SLS will produce
23biased results stemming from the correlation between the regime choice and the error term either
29 in the inflation  or growth equation.
It should be noted that addressing the sample selection problem will also address the issue
of  the  endogeneity of  the  choice of  the  exchange rate  regime.  This  is  not  achieved by
instrumenting  the dummy variable for the exchange rate regime a la Ghosh (1997).  Instead, it is
achieved through the assumption of constant covariance between the error term in the structural
equation  and  the  normally  distributed  random  variable whose  realization  determines the
exchange rate regime.
In an attempt to address the above mentioned problems plaguing empirical work in this
literature, we  propose  an  empirical  framework which  is  based  on  a  switching  regression
technique.  To  this  end,  the  investigation employs the  following standard formulation of
switching  regression:
Yi = XiBj+uj  if  Vi < Zjr+al,  i=l ...................  I,  (1)
Yi=XiB 2+u 21 ifZ 1y+za<v<Zity+a 2 ,  i=l..I2 (2)
Yi =XiB3+U3i  if  vi  >ZiY+  0f2,  i=l  1...................I3  (3)
ujj  is iidN(O,  j),while vi is iidN(O,  1), cov(ui,vi)=avj=1,2,3
where (1), (2), and (3) correspond to respective regimes.  The only difference with respect to the
standard switching regression model is that we  employ the same set  of regressors in each
equation in order to  be able to test the equality of the coefficients across the regimes.  The
regime is determined by the realization of normally distributed random variable v,  which is not
observable. We, however, know in which of three areas it is realized.  Therefore, a>,  a2, and y
29 To be more precise, this bias arises from the correlation between the error term of the latent variable capturing the
regime choice and the error of the structural equation.
24can be  estimated by ordered probit approach. It should be noted that Z should not contain a
constant term since a, and a2 are already in the model.
Given the following equations:
E(u,,  vi < Z1Y  + a,) = -'-'  F(Z  +a,)  = -c 1(Zir +  a,) = -avli  (4)
E(ujl vi > Ziy + a2) =  C3V  -f(Z,y  + a2)  = a3A 3(Zi7+a 2) =  C 3v 3 i(
1_-F(Zy7+  a2)  (5)
E(u 11 IyZ +a,  <vi <Zir+a 2 )  =  02v  f(Zy  + a)  - f(Z7  + a 2)  =  a2vk (Zy, a ,, a2) = o2h2  (6)
F(Ziy +a2) -F(Z7  +  a,)
wheref(f) and F(.) stand for density and cumulative normal distribution functions, respectively.
One can, then, express the equations for corresponding  regimes as:
Yi= X1B 1 - alvkli  + eli  (7)
Yi  =XB 2 +  o 2,h2i + e2 1 (8)
Yi =XjB3 + a3-h 3i +  e3 1 (9)
where the disturbance term in each equation is of mean zero and heteroscedastic.  The above
presented model can be estimated in two steps.  In the first step, we estimate a  and y by ordered
probit approach. In the second step, we first insert the obtained estimates into the above system
[ (7)-(9)] and then run 2SLS (by instrumenting  for endogenous variables) for each regime in the
system presented below [(10)-(12)]:
25y  = XiB1 -oJ 1r  + e,i  (10)
Y, = XB 2 + 0211  + e2 (11)
Y  = XiB3 +  3vA + ei  (12)
Indeed, the above described estimation method amounts to two-step Heckman procedure.
Once we acquire the rest of the coefficients from the first stage, and correct the variance and
covariance matrix,  we  can  then test  for the  relevance of  regimes, that  is Ho: B,=B2=B 3,
cr/V=o2v=q3,=O;  HI:  otherwise.
6. Empirical Results
6.1 The Determinants of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
The  "impossible  trinit"  of  fixed exchange  rates,  independent monetary  policy,  and
freedom of capital movements has been widely acknowledged by economists for a long time.
Countries cannot attain  monetary independence, exchange rate  stability,  and  full  financial
integration simultaneously.  They have to  choose which of these objectives they will drop,
although most governments defy the choice and try to fudge in various way, often generating
financial crises in the process [(Cooper (1999)].
As was pointed out by Cooper (1999), floating rates, independent monetary policy, and
freedom of capital movements may also be incompatible-at  least for countries with small and
poorly developed domestic capital markets.  In turn, this would leave the following choice for
such countries: between floating rates with capital restrictions and some monetary autonomy or
fixed rates free of capital restrictions but with loss of monetary autonomy.  The unwelcome
26conclusion, as he puts it, is that free movements of capital and a floating exchange rate are
basically incompatible, except for large and  diversified economies with well-developed and
sophisticated  financial markets. 30
Where does the empirical research stand on the determinants of the choice of the exchange
rate regime?  Since the studies conducted by Dreyer (1978); Heller (1978) and Holden et al
(1979), few empirical studies have focused on the choice of exchange rate regime.  More recent
studies [Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1994) and Edwards (1996)] and dramatic events in Asia,
Russia and Brazil have rekindled the interest on this topic.  Majority of the studies to  date,
however,  did  not  distinguish  developing  countries  and  transition  economies  and  largely
considered the importance of criteria resulting directly from the theory of optimum currency
areas.
For instance, Edwards (1996) finds that countries' historical degree of political instability,
various measures of the probability of abandoning pegged rates, and variables related to the
relative importance of real targets in the preferences of monetary authorities have the most
important explanatory powers.  More precisely, his results suggest that more unstable countries
have a lower probability of selecting pegged exchange-rate systems, while countries with a lower
growth rate and capital account restrictions tend to prefer a more rigid exchange rate regime.
More advanced countries, on the other hand, have a tendency to select more flexible rates.
A  recent  study  by  Rizzo  (1998)  analyzes the  choice  of  exchange  rate  regimes by
developing countries for the period of 1977-95.  His results indicate that countries with low
inflation tend to have fixed rather than flexible exchange rates.  The levels of the external debt
and the public deficit, however, do not have any significant explanatory  power.
30 See Eichengreen  and Masson (1998) for a detailed discussion of criteria for exchange rate regime choice.
27To analyze the determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in transition countries,
we  employ ordered probit econometric technique.  The econometric model is based  on the
assumption that one  can order  exchange rate regimes in  terrms of intensities, which  seems
plausible in the current context.
The variables that we consider largely draw on the empirical specifications employed in
previous studies. More specifically, in our attempt to explain the choice of exchange rate regime
we utilize variables capturing: progress in  structural reforns31; macroeconomic policy; and
macroeconomic  conditions. All the variables are lagged to avoid simultaneity problems.
32 Table 2 reports the results of the ordered probit regression.  To conserve space, we
exclude the variables that are jointly statistically insignificant. 33
Table  2. Results of Ordered  Probit  Regressions  for the Choice  of the  Exchange  Rate  Regime'
Coefficient  Std.  Deviation  z-statistics  Probability
Res./MB  0.790  0.255  3.093  [.002]
Budget  Balance  -0.084  0.030  -2.840  [.005]
External  Markets  4.149  1.407  2.950  [.003]
Private  sector  entry  -5.707  1.063  -5.370  [.000]
Internal  Markets  -7.381  1.743  4.236  [.000]
Openness  -2.199  0.496  4.434  [.000]
al  -7.872  1.187  -6.632  [.000]
a  2 -5.573  1.044  -5.335  [.000]
Scaled  R2=0.64
Number  of observations  =113
a: Positive sign means that the flexible regime is more likely and the fixed regimne  is less
31 We draw on indicators  constructed  by De Melo, Denizer,  and Gelb (1997)  in the following  areas: (i) internal  markets
(liberalization  of domestic  prices  and abolition  of state trading  monopolies);  (ii) external  markets  ( currency  convertibility  and
liberalization  of the foreign  trade regime,  including  elimination  of export  controls  and taxes as well as substitution  of low to
moderate  import  duties  for  import  quotas  and high  import  tariffs);  and (iii)  private  sector  entry  (privatization  of small-scale  and
large-scale  enterprises  and  banking  reform).
32 See Appendix  4 for  a detailed  description  of data.
33 Among  the variables  that we included  but found  to be jointly  insignificant  are: lags of inflation  ,external  debt,  GDP growth,
and German  as well  as American  interest  rates  (to capture  the importance  of the external  conditions).
28All the coefficients, with the exception of the ratio of reserves to monetary base, are
significant and have the expected signs. The fact that reserves to monetary base ratio (Res/MB)
carries a positive coefficient would mean that fixed exchange regimes are associated with a
lower level of Res/MB compared to floating regimes.  Although, at first blush, this findings
appears to be  counterintuitive, it raises the  possibility of a non-linear relationship between
choice of exchange rate regime and the ratio of reserves to monetary base.  This non-linearity
may arise because a country with a low level of reserves is likely to be in favor of more flexible
arrangements.  When a country has high reserves, however, the increase in credibility associated
with fixing the exchange rate would be marginal. As a result, the country would be  more likely
to opt for more flexible arrangements.
In order to address the possibility of non-linearity between Res/MB and the choice of the
exchange rate regime, we, first, included a squared term of this variable in the above estimated
ordered probit regression.  The square term, however, turned out to be insignificant.  Next, we
explored the possibility of a kinked relationship by breaking the variable into three intervals. We
considered a continuous relationship in which each interval has its own slope.  To determine the
points of the kink, we ran a grid search. The result was quite surprising: for values smaller than
1.35 and higher than 1.40, the slope turns out to be insignificant. However, between these values
the slope is not only large and positive, but also statistically  significant.
Since the results suggest that the slope is statistically significant only in the middle portion
of the kinked line-indeed  a very small interval-one  can infer that there is a threshold above
which countries tend to avoid fixed regimes. This, in turn, provides a rationale to use a dummy
variable to capture this threshold.  To this end, we use a grid-search again. The results of the
29grid-search indicate that the best fit is found for the dummy which takes value of one whenever
reserve to monetary base ratio exceeds 1.34 and zero otherwise. 34
Table 3 presents the results of the new probit regression which considers the above
mentioned non-linearity between Res/MB and the choice of the exchange rate regime.  As
expected, more open economies and countries with lower budget deficits tend to accept more
stringent exchange rate regimes.  Countries that made more progress in the areas of internal
markets and private sector entry are also more likely to opt for more stringent exchange rate
arrangements. Countries that achieved more progress in openness to external markets, on the
other hand, tend to  adopt more flexible arrangements.  Moreover, positive  and  significant
coefficient associated with the dummy for Res/MB confirms that countries with Res/MB above
certain threshold, 1.34, tend to adopt more flexible arrangements.
Table  3. Results  of Ordered  Probit  Regressions  for the  Choice  of the Exchange  Rate Regimea
Coefficient  Std.  Deviation  z-statistics  Probability
Dummy  for Res/MBb  1.309  0.352  3.717  [.000]
Budget  Balance  -0.074  0.028  -2.623  [.009]
External  Markets  3.656  1.408  2.597  [.009]
Private  Sector  Entry  -5.363  1.027  -5.223  [.000]
Internal  Markets  -6.787  1.684  -4.031  [.000]
Openness  -2.097  0.489  -4.292  [.000]
a,  -8.105  1.177  -6.887  [.000]
a2 -5.768  1.037  -5.560  [.000]
Scaled  R 2= 0.66
Number  of observations=  113
a: Positive  sign  means  that the flexible  regime  is more  likely  and the fixed  regime  is less
b: Variable  takes  value  1 if reserve  to monetary  Base  ratio is greater  than 1.34
34 It should be  noted that use of the dummy instead of actual values of the variable is justified by zero slopes outside
the small interval.
30All in all, the empirical findings suggest that transition economies tend to adopt more
stringent exchange rate regimes when they: (i) have lower budget deficits; (ii) have a higher ratio
of exports plus imports to GDP; and (iii) are more advanced in the areas of private sector entry
and internal markets. While the results suggest that those with more progress in external  markets
and with Res/MB above 1.34 opt for more flexible exchange rate arrangements.
6.2 The Exchange Rate Regime and the Inflation Performance
A quick glance at the literature on exchange rate regimes and inflation suggests that fixed
exchange rate regimes-in  the presence of consistent macro policies-tend  to deliver lower and
more stable rates of inflation. These studies offer two explanations. Fixed rates provide a visible
commitment,  thereby raising the political costs of excessive monetary growth.  A credible peg is
likely to engender a more robust demand for money, which, in turn, reduces the inflationary
consequences  of a given monetary expansion.3
Ghosh et. al (1997) conducted one of the most comprehensive  multi-country studies on the
influence of exchange rate regimes on macroeconomic performance. In their investigation, they
employ  a  comprehensive  econometric  framework  and  undertake  several  sensitivity  and
robustness tests.  Their results suggest that the inflation rate is significantly lower under pegged
exchange rates than under more flexible arrangements-even  after controlling for the effects of
money growth and interest rates.
Although their  empirical investigation makes an attempt to  address some of the usual
problems plaguing empirical work in this strand of the literature, it is still subject to several
limitations.  The most obvious one is the Lucas critique which postulates that when there is a
35 Ghosh et. al. (1995). Studies by Crockett and Goldstein (1976), Quirk (1994), and Tornell and Velasco (1995),
however, dispute this conjecture.
31policy switch the coefficients associated with policy variables should change.  Indeed, one
should expect a different response of inflation to changes in the budget deficit and money growth
under different regimes.
The Lucas critique could be addressed by estimating the inflation equation separately for
each exchange rate  regime  under  an  empirical framework similar  to  Ghosh  et  al (1997).
However, such an approach would be subject to sample selection problem.  The sample selection
problem stems from the fact that the choice of exchange rate regimes is not a random process
and that the decision on the exchange rate regime is based on factors that also affect inflation.
Consequently, the use of standard econometric techniques such as OLS or 2SLS will produce
biased results stemming from the correlation between the regime choice and the error term in
inflation equation.
In  order  to  address the  above mentioned problems, we  employ switching regression
framework, as explained in Section 5.  Prior to employing the switching regression analysis, we
estimate a reduced form equation for inflation using a similar methodology employed by Ghosh
et. al. (1997) for comparison purposes.  Specifically, we use  two-stage least squares (2SLS) in
the estimation of the inflation equation, which includes reserves to monetary base ratio, 36  the
budget balance (measured as  a percent  of GDP),  GDP growth, broad money growth,  and
dummies for the exchange rate regimes. 3 '
The results are reported in Table 4.  The findings suggest that increases in Res/MB ratio
and GDP growth lower inflation, while increases in broad money growth have a positive impact
on inflation.  Although the exchange rate dummies turn out to be  statistically significant, the
36 Reserves to monetary base ratio and budget balance reflect the credibility of monetary policy, which, in turn,
affects inflation expectations.
37 A more detailed discussion regarding the instruments  employed in the estimation will be provided later in this
section.
32result of the Wald test (chi-square statistics of 3.946 with tail probability 0.14) suggests that the
null hypothesis that dummies are equal cannot be rejected. 38 As  indicated previously, the
dummy variable approach does not control for sample selection bias  and assumes identical
slopes for all regimes. This, in turn, may create a substantial bias in the results.
Next, we estimate the second stage regression for inflation equation, which includes, in
addition to  the variables  listed previously, the  generalized residuals  of  the  ordered probit
regression-the  covariance term-using  switching regression technique described in Section 5.39
In  essence, this  regression is a  second stage of Heckman's  two-step procedure  to  estimate
switching regression (the first step was the ordered probit).
Table 4. The Exchange Rate Regime and the Inflation Performance (2SLS)
Coefficient  Std. Deviation  t-statistic
Dummy for fix  0.093  0.042  2.200
Dummy for intermediate  0.152  0.044  3.432
Dummy for float  0.123  0.052  2.365
Lagged Res/MB  -0.104  0.023  -4.621
Budget Balance  0.002  0.004  0.439
GDP growth  -0.012  0.002  -5.804
Broad money growth  0.666  0.075  8.901
Dummy for Central Europe  0.056  0.022  2.518
Dummy for Baltic Countries  0.079  0.047  1.684
R2=0.22
Adj. R12=0.14
Number of observations=1  13
Ideally, we would like to run fixed effects as the fixed effects dummies would capture
initial conditions pertaining to inflation. Unfortunately, inadequate degrees of freedom for fixed
regimes prevent us from employing fixed effects.  As a result, we group the countries involved
into three categories and create three dummy variables: former Soviet  Union, Eastern Europe
38 The exchange rate dummy for the fixed regime is lower than the others, though  not statistically significant from them.
33and Baltic countries. Since we use a constant term in each regime the regression contains only
two of the dummies.
Prior to presenting the empirical results, several comments are in order.  In the estimation,
we  instrument  GDP  growth,  budget  balance  and  broad  money  growth  for  potential
endogeneity. 40 In this respect, endogeneity of money growth deserves a special consideration.
Clearly, this variable cannot be considered as a policy variable under fixed and intermediate
regimes since it is endogeneously determined.  However, a series of recent papers demonstrated
that countries that claim they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not-a  phenomenon
referred to as "fear of floatinge'. 41  To clarify this, we employ a Hausman test to determine
whether broad money growth is endogenous under flexible regime.  The result of this test-chi-
square statistics of  19 with 0.006 tail probability-suggests  that this variable is endogeneous
under float as well. 42
Table 5 reports the results of switching regression estimates.  In our  attempt to study
whether the  exchange rate  regime  matters  for  inflation performance, we,  first,  test  joint
hypothesis that all coefficients are equal across the regimes, and the estimated covariances are all
equal to zero (that is in our notation: Ho: B,=B2=B 3,  ,vcrl  2v=U3v=O).  The result of the Wald
test statistics, which is equal to 30 with tail probability 0.003, suggests that exchange rate regime
does make a difference for inflation performance.  Moreover, we also conduct two additional
39  We, in the second step, have also tried maximum likelihood estimation in lieu of 2SLS, but failed to achieve convergence.
40  The instrument list for the budget balance includes lagged budget balance, lagged inflation, external debt to GDP ratio, lagged
GDP growth. For broad money growth, it includes lagged money growth, lagged inflation, lagged budget deficit, and lagged
GDP growth.  For GDP growth, it includes lag liberalization index, lag of change in liberalization index, lagged budget deficit,
lagged GDP growth, lagged inflation, initial condition, and the covariance term. The inclusion of the switching term into the
GDP growth instrument list is justified by the presence of it in the structural equation for GDP growth.
41 See, for instance, Calvo and Reinhart (2000a, 2000b).
42One of the implications of this test might be that the countries announcing floating regime also intervene in the exchange
market, which makes it dirty float along the lines of the arguments put forth by Calvo and Reinhart (2000a, 2000b).  However  the
above presented evidence is not  sufficient for making such a strong statement. There could be other factors making money
growth endogeneous. For instance,  interactions between inflation and money growth - in the presence of  sticky prices  a
government would avoid cutting rate of expansion of money supply to prevent high interest rates and consequent recession.
34tests, namely the equality of coefficients associated with the budget balance and money growth
across the regimes. The results suggest that the null hypothesis of the equality of the coefficients
associated with the budget balance cannot be rejected at 5 percent significance level (chi-square
statistics of 4.6  with tail probability 0.10), while the null of the equality of the coefficients
associated with broad money growth is rejected (chi-square statistics of 17.9 with tail probability
0.006).
The covariance term appears to be  significant only under flexible regime.43  It has a
negative  and  statistically  significant  coefficient.  This  finding  suggests  that  the  more
unanticipated the floating regime on the basis of fundamentals considered in our ordered probit
regression, the lower the inflation.  Put differently, an unanticipated  float-a  country that with
its fundamentals would be likely to adopt another regime, but it adopts floating regime-results
in lower inflation.
The empirical findings also confirm that money growth has  a positive and statistically
significant  impact on inflation under all regimes. It is interesting  to note that the effect of money
growth on inflation is the largest under the intermediate regime. 44 However, this finding should
not be interpreted as money growth causing higher inflation under intermediate regime compared
to fixed and floating regime.  It might be arising from the fact that larger part of the impact of
money growth on inflation under fixed and floating regimes is captured by other variables.
Indeed, a glance at the correlation matrix of variables involved indicates that broad money
growth is more correlated with budget deficit and GDP growth under fixed regime, while it is
more correlated with GDP growth and Res/MB under floating compared to intermediate regime.
43 This finding also suggests that there is no sample selection  problem under fixed and intermediate regimes.
44 It should be noted that the reported coefficients  are partial derivatives and should be interpreted accordingly.
35The results suggest that economic growth has a negative and statistically significant impact
on inflation under floating and fixed regimes. While the budget balance appears to be significant
only under a fixed regime. The negative sign associated with the budget balance is likely to
reflect two  channels: credibility (inflation rises under  imperfect credibility) and  Keynesian
(expansionary  fiscal policy increases inflation).
Table 5. Results of the Switching Regression Estimates : Inflation Equation
Coefficient  Std. Deviation  t-statistic
Fixed Exchan2e  rate Reeime
Constant  -0.004  0.081  -0.052
Lagged  Res/MB  -0.005  0.050  -0.099
Budget  Balance  -0.010  0.005  -2.161
GDP  growth  -0.008  0.004  -2.194
Broad  money  growth  0.336  0.140  2.399
Covariance  0.010  0.023  0.422
Intermediate Exchanee  rate Regime
Constant  -0.037  0.074  -0.497
Lagged  Res/MB  -0.078  0.034  -2.274
Budget  Balance  -0.012  0.008  -1.587
GDP  growth  0.006  0.004  1.465
Broad  money  growth  0.986  0.110  8.924
Covariance  -0.003  0.037  -0.092
Floating Exchange  rate Regime
Constant  0.434  0.137  3.164
Lagged  Res/MB  -0.152  0.070  -2.164
Budget  Balance  0.008  0.008  1.021
GDP  growth  -0.016  0.003  -5.112
Broad  money  growth  0.304  0.173  1.756
Covariance  -0.159  0.069  -2.304
Dummy for  Central  Europe  0.047  0.045  1.046
Dummyfor Baltic Countries  0.105  0.058  1.807
R2=0.69
Adj.  R2=0.63
Number  of observations  =113
36The empirical findings also indicate that, contrary to intermediate and floating regimes,
reserves to  monetary base  ratio-a  variable which captures the credibility of the monetary
authorities in defending the exchange rate-does  not play any role under a fixed regimes. This
finding could be  attributed to several factors.  First, it is possible that  countries with  fixed
exchange rate regime use other mechanisms to enhance credibility.  Second, it is also possible
that countries with fixed exchange regimes usually have a sufficiently high level of reserves and
variation in reserves does not affect the credibility of the regime and thus inflation.
Furthermore, the finding that reserves to monetary base ratio is negative and significant
under both intermediate and floating regimes could be explained by the phenomenon referred to
as  fear offloating arising from lack of credibility. More specifically, it is argued that developing
countries are often plagued by a lack of credibility and limited access to international markets,
more pronounced adverse effects of exchange rate volatility on trade, high liability dollarization,
and higher passthrough from exchange rate to inflation-all  of which cause the authorities to
resist large movements in the exchange rate. 45 As a result, the reserves to monetary base ratio
reflects the authorities' ability to smooth large fluctuations in the exchange rate even under
floating and intermediate regimes and, in turn, will be deemed as an important sign of credibility
by agents.
In light of our findings, what can we conclude concerning the impact of the exchange
regime on inflation?  To this end, we perform simulations to determine whether a particular
exchange rate regime would have delivered lower (or higher) inflation compared to the one
already adopted.  We acknowledge that such an exercise has its limitations.  In particular, this
exercise is conducted by using the realized values of variables involved under one regime to
determine how the country in  question would have performed under  another exchange rate
37arrangement  (see Appendix 3 ).  In other words, it is assumed that countries that are simulated to
adopt another regime follow the same policies as before. Obviously, this shortcoming would be
much more pronounced under simulation exercises involving the two extreme cases:  fixed and
floating regimes.46 Moreover, since we rely on an ad hoc model for inflation in transition
countries, the simulation results should be interpreted with caution.  Nonetheless, with these
limitations recognized, this approach relies on a much less restrictive assumption compared to
existing empirical work, which imposes the same coefficients for all regimes.
Table 6.  Inflation Simulations
Mean  Median
If float  were  running  Intermediate
Fitted inflation (float)  0.32  0.31
Simulated inflation (intermediate)  0.37  0.36
If Intermediate  were  running  float
Fitted inflation (intermediate)  0.21  0.20
Simulated inflation (float)  0.33  0.28
If Intermediate  were  running  Fix
Fitted inflation (intermediate)  0.21  0.20
Simulated inflation (fix)  0.13  0.10
If Fix  were  running  Intermediate
Fitted inflation (fix)  0.13  0.10
Simulated inflation (intermediate)  0.19  0.19
Based on the simulation results, the following observations emerge: (i) if a country with a
floating regime were to move an intermediate regime, it would have higher inflation; (ii) if a
country with  an  intermediate regime  adopted  floating regime,  it  would  experience higher
inflation; (iii) if a country with an intermediate regime were to run a fixed regime, the country
45 See Calvo and Reinhart (2000a, 2000b) for more on this.
46 Consequently,  we do not perform the simulation exercises involving fixed and floating regimes.
38would experience lower inflation; (iv) if  a  country with  a  fixed regime  were to  adopt an
intermediate regime, it would experience  higher inflation.
With  above  mentioned  caveats,  the  results  imply  that  countries  with  intermediate
arrangements may achieve lower inflation if they were to adopt a fixed regime.  The findings
also suggest that switching from a  floating regime to an intermediate arrangement may not
deliver lower inflation since existing fundamentals of the countries with floating regime are
likely to be inappropriate for intermediate regime.
6.3 The Exchange Rate Regime and the Growth Performance
Contrary to the attention paid to the nominal effects of the exchange regime choice, only a
few studies have attempted to investigate the consequences of the exchange regime in place for
economic growth. 47 The existing literature has highlighted two main channels through which
the exchange rate can affect output growth: either through the rate of factor accumulation-
investment or employment-or  through the  growth rate of  total  factor productivity.  More
specifically, it has been argued that fixed exchange rate regime promote investment by reducing:
(i) policy uncertainties; (ii) exchange rate volatility; and (iii) real interest rates.  Fixed rates,
however, could exacerbate protectionist pressures and, in tum, decrease the efficiency of a given
stock of capital. In addition, fix rates may lead to misalignment of the real exchange and thereby
undermine efficient resource allocation.
The burgeoning empirical work on growth in transition economies has paid little attention
to the potential non-neutrality of the exchange rate regime in terms of growth. 48 Relatively few
studies attempted to investigate this issue only by including a dummy variable for the fixed
4 7 Aizman (1991), Mills and Wood  (1993),  and  Ghosh  et. al. (1997).
39exchange rate regime. 49 For instance, Fischer et al (1996) found that the coefficient associated
with  the  fixed exchange rate  regime  in  their  growth equation  is  positive  and  significant,
underscoring the positive impact of the use of the fixed rates on growth.  However, more recent
studies showed that the pegged regime did not have statistically significant impact on growth
[Berg et al (1999) and Christofersen  and Doyle (1998)].
Empirical studies investigating growth in transition economies usually include various
indices capturing the progress in structural reforms and key macro variables expected to affect
growth along with a set of variables reflecting initial conditions. The most comprehensive study
is conducted by Berg et. al (1999). They employ several specifications and a general-to-specific
econometric approach to decompose the relative contributions to growth of initial conditions,
structural reforms, and macroeconomic variables. Contrary to the previous studies, they attempt
to address the issue of endogeneity of right-hand-side variables.  In particular, they instrument
budget deficit with IMF programs' forecasts. Their empirical findings underscore the superiority
of structural reforms over both initial conditions and macroeconomic variables in  explaining
cross-country differences in performance and the timing of the recovery.
Our  main  objective  in  this  section  is  not  to  conduct  a  comprehensive  empirical
investigation of economic growth in transition economies.  Indeed, explaining growth is a much
more difficult task than explaining inflation since it is a multi-dimensional process involving
numerous interactions among economic agents.  Instead, our main goal is to investigate whether
the exchange rate regime has any  impact on  growth in  transition economies by  utilizing a
reduced form equation for growth that draws on existing empirical studies.  Contrary to the
previous studies, our empirical framework does not assume that coefficients of policy variables
48 See, for instance,  De Melo et al (1996), Fischer et al (1996a, 1996b, 1997), Selowsky  and Martin (1997),
Havyrylyshn  et al (1998),  Heybey  and Murrell(1999),  and Fischer  et al (2000).
40are the same under all regimes and hence it is not subject to the Lucas Critique. Moreover, our
framework  considers  the  endogeneity  of  inflation,  the  budget  balance,  change  in  the
liberalization index as well as of the exchange rate regime in  the growth equation and also
addresses the issue of the sample selection  problem.
Once again, prior to employing the switching regression analysis, we estimate our reduced
form equation for growth using a similar methodology employed by Ghosh et. al. (1997). More
precisely, we use 2SLS to  estimate the growth equation which includes the budget balance,
change in the liberalization index, lagged liberalization index, inflation and initial conditions
(the number of years under communism, share of industry, urbanization, share of CMEA trade).
In our specification, we instrument all the contemporaneous variables  (including change in
liberalization index) with their lagged values and with other exogenous variables. 50
Table 7 presents the empirical results of 2SLS estimation. The empirical findings suggest
that inflation, change in the liberalization index, lagged liberalization index all have a negative
impact on growth.  The results also imply that an increase in the budget balance has an adverse
effect  on  growth.  The  exchange  rate  dummies turn  out  to  be  statistically insignificant.
Moreover, the result of the Wald test  suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
dummies are jointly equal to zero at 5 percent significance level (chi-square statistics of 4.95
with tail probability 0.175).
49 See,  for  instance,  Fischer  et al (1996),  Christofersen  and  Doyle  (1998)  and  Berg  et al (1999)
so  The instrument  list for inflation  includes  lagged  budget  balance,  lagged  inflation,  lagged  money  growth,  lagged
liberalization  index,  Res/MB  ratio,  initial  conditions,  and the covariance  term.  For the budget  balance,  it includes:
lagged  budget  balance,  lagged  inflation,  lagged  GDP  growth,  and lagged  external  debt  to GDP ratio. For change  in
the liberalization  index,  it includes:  lagged  change  in liberalization  index,  lagged liberalization  index,  lagged  GDP
growth,  and  lagged  inflation.
41Table 7. The Exchange Rate Regime and the Growth Performance  (2SLS)
Coefficient Std Deviation  t-statistic
Dummy for fix regime  0.10  0.20  0.50
Dummy for intermediate  0.13  0.20  0.63
Dummy for float  0.08  0.20  0.42
Budget Balance  -0.01  0.00  -3.31
Change in liberalization Index  -0.63  0.20  -3.21
Lagged Liberalization Index  -0.31  0.11  -2.86
Inflation  -0.34  0.06  -5.56
Urbanization  0.00  0.00  -0.36
CMEA  0.00  0.00  -1.06
Years under communism  0.00  0.00  0.45
Industry  0.21  0.09  2.47
Dummy for Central Europe  0.08  0.07  1.14
Dummy for Baltic Countries  0.13  0.06  2.03
R =0.  17
Adj. R2=0.06
Number of observations=1  13
Next, we estimate the growth equation using switching regression technique described in
Section 5.  Table  8  presents the  empirical results.  We, first,  test joint  hypothesis  that all
coefficients are equal across the regimes, and the estimated covariances are all equal to zero.
The result of the Wald test statistics, which is equal to 26.23 with tail probability 0.016, suggests
that policy actions (and also variables affecting economic activity) have different impacts on
growth under different exchange rate regimes.  Moreover, we also perform an additional test,
namely all coefficients associated with the covariance terms are jointly equal to zero.  The result
of the Wald test indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (chi-square statistics of 1.5
with tail probability 0.67), suggesting that there is no sample selection problem. Based on these
results, it is not possible to make any inferences about a particular exchange rate regime being
superior to another in terms of growth performance. Nonetheless, it is possible to conclude that
the impact of policy and non-policy factors on growth is different under different exchange rate
arrangements.
42The empirical findings also underscore the deleterious effect of inflation on growth across
the regimes. The empirical results, on the other hand, do not produce clear-cut evidence on the
impact of lagged liberalization index and change in liberalization index.  For instance, lagged
liberalization index has a positive  effect on growth under a fixed regime, while it is negatively
associated with  growth under  intermediate regime  and not  significant at  all under  floating
regime.  Change in liberalization index turns out to have a negative and statistically significant
influence on  growth only  under  intermediate regimes.  These  findings are  not  surprising;
previous empirical studies also failed to report a strong clear-cut relationship between these
variables.51
It is interesting  to note that the explanatory powers of the regressions reported in Tables 11
and  12 are  considerably lower than the previous  empirical studies  investigating growth in
transition economies.  This is likely to arise from the fact that majority of the previous studies
did not use instruments for endogenous variables-with  the exception of Berg et al (1999) who
instrumented for the budget balance-and  thus not only over-estimated the explanatory  power of
their regressions, but also suffered from inconsistent estimates.  Indeed, when we estimate our
regressions reported in Tables 11 and 12 without using instruments, we get noticeably higher
R2s. It could be argued since we use lagged values of relevant variables as instruments, this may
significantly lower the efficiency of our regressions in view of the drastic changes that transition
countries have been undergoing. Nonetheless, we prefer consistent estimates with low R2s over
the biased estimates with high indicators of explanatory  powers.
5  See, for instance, Popov (2000) for more detailed discussion of this issue.
43Table 8. Results of the Switching Regression Estimates: Growth Equation
Coefficient  Std Dev t-statistic
Fixed  Exchanee  rate  Re-ime
Constant  -0.80  0.32  -2.50
Budget  Balance  0.00  0.00  -1.47
Change  in liberalization  Index  0.73  0.51  1.45
Lagged  Liberalization  Index  0.76  0.34  2.26
Inflation  -0.44  0.14  -3.14
Covariance  -0.01  0.02  -0.63
Intermediate  Exchange  rate  Regime
Constant  0.16  0.17  0.94
Budget  Balance  -0.01  0.00  -2.44
Change  in liberalization  Index  -1.20  0.26  -4.60
Lagged  Liberalization  Index  -0.36  0.14  -2.64
Inflation  -0.25  0.07  -3.60
Covariance  0.00  0.02  -0.16
Floatine  Exchanee  rate ReL  ime
Constant  -0.09  0.18  -0.53
Budget  Balance  0.00  0.00  0.26
Change  in liberalization  Index  0.06  0.25  0.25
Lagged  Liberalization  Index  0.04  0.17  0.22
Inflation  -0.26  0.08  -3.37
Covariance  -0.04  0.04  -1.04
Urbanization  0.00  0.00  -0.05
CMEA  0.00  0.00  0.18
Years under communism  0.00  0.00  0.87
Industry  0.10  0.12  0.84
Dummyfor  Central  Europe  0.10  0.05  2.09
Dummyfor Baltic Countries  0.08  0.05  1.69
R2=0.35
Adj.  R2=0.17
Number  of observations  =  113
What can be gleaned from our empirical findings in terms of the link between growth and
the exchange rate regime in place? Recognizing the poor performance of the growth equation
and previously mentioned limitations of the simulation exercise, the results of this exercise are
reported in Table 9.
44Table 9. Growth Simulations
Mean  Median
If float  were  running  Intermediate
Fitted growth (float)  -0.13  -0.009
Simulated growth (intermediate)  0.003  0.007
If Intermediate  were  running  float
Fitted growth (intermediate)  0.017  0.023
Simulated growth (float)  0.073  0.086
If Intermediate  were  running  Fix
Fitted growth (intermediate)  0.017  0.023
Simulated growth (fix)  -0.04  -0.0004
If Fix were  running  Intermediate
Fitted growth (fix)  0.031  0.046
Simulated growth (intermediate)  0.018  0.038
Based on the simulation results, the followings observations can be made: (i) if a country
with a floating regime were to run an intermediate regime, it would have  slightly higher growth;
(ii) if a country with an intermediate regime were to adopt a floating regime, it would experience
higher growth; (iii) if a country with an intermediate regime were to run a fixed regime, the
country would experience lower growth; (iv) if a country with a fixed regime were to adopt an
intermediate  regime, it would experience lower growth.
Unfortunately, given the poor  performance of  estimates of  the  growth equation and
inconclusive simulation results, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions concerning the link
between the exchange rate regime and growth.
456.4 Robustness Test
As a robustness test, we make an attempt to test the sensitivity of our findings with respect
to survival bias by excluding the switch year.  More precisely, we exclude the switch year to
check the validity of our conclusions. 52 Both in the case of inflation and growth equations, our
previous results concerning the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are equal across the regimes
and the estimated covariances are all equal to zero remain intact (23.5 with tail probability 0.036
for  the inflation equation and  42.8 with tail  probability 0.00005 for  the growth  equation).
Moreover, the coefficient estimates in the case of the inflation equation, including the covariance
term,  do not  change significantly except for  the budget deficit under  fixed regime whose
significance declines. The growth equation, however, does not perform very well with respect to
this robustness  test, particularly in the case of fixed regime.
7. Conclusions
The debate over the most appropriate exchange rate arrangement has been one of the most
controversial topics in the literature.  Economists have debated for a century without reaching
any firm conclusions. In spite of its increasing policy relevance, the literature offers relatively
few empirical studies and those that do exist focus mainly on developed or developing countries,
without providing any evidence on transition countries.  To this end, we attempt to make two
contributions.  First, we develop an empirical framework to address some of the main problems
plaguing empirical work in this strand of the literature, namely the Lucas Critique, endogeneity
of  the exchange rate  regime,  and the sample selection problem.  We  employ a  switching
regression model which is estimated using a two-step Heckman procedure. More specifically,
52 Due to degrees of freedom limitations, we cannot exclude three observations (that is one year before and after the regime
change) a la Ghosh (1997).
46we, first, estimate the equation for the choice of the exchange rate regime by using ordered  probit
and then utilize a switching regression technique to investigate whether the exchange rate regime
affects macroeconomic  performance
Second,  we  use  this  framework  to  study  whether  the  exchange  regime  affects
macroeconomic performance in transition countries-an  issue which has not been subject to a
thorough empirical investigation to date.
Prior to highlighting the principal conclusions that emerge from our study, we recognize
the limitations of our empirical findings that arise from the inclusion of a relatively small number
of countries (only 22 countries) and a time period of less than 10 years as well as from questions
concerning the reliability of data (particularly data on GDP growth ) for transition economies.
Another limitation arises from the use of a dejure exchange rate classification, which is based on
the publicly stated commitment of the exchange rate. 53
Our empirical findings on the choice of the exchange rate regime suggest that transition
economies that: (i) have lower budget deficits; (ii) are more open (i.e. have a higher ratio of
exports plus imports to GDP); and (iii) made more progress in the areas of private sector entry
and internal markets tend to  adopt more stringent exchange rate regimes.  While the results
suggest that those with more progress in external markets and with a reserves to monetary base
ratio above 1.34 opt for more flexible exchange rate arrangements.
Moreover, our  empirical  results suggest that  the exchange  rate regime  does  make a
difference for inflation performance.  More specifically, the findings imply that countries with
intermediate arrangements may achieve lower inflation if they were to adopt a fixed regime.  The
53 Although a recent promnising  study by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) constructed a de  facto classification of the
exchange rate regimes for the period of 1990-98, the use of their classification in our research would be undesirable on two
grounds. First, the use of their data set would reduce the number of observations significantly and thus would not be comparable
to our findings based on de jure  classification.  Second, their attempt to construct de facto classification of the exchange rate
47results also suggest that switching from a floating regime to an intermediate arrangement may
not deliver lower inflation since existing fundamentals of the countries with floating regime tend
to be inappropriate for an intermediate regime.  However, when a country with an intermediate
regime switches to a floating regime, it experiences a higher inflation.
The results also suggest that an unanticipatedfloat-a  situation describing a country where
fundamentals suggest it  is likely to  adopt another regime, but  it adopts  instead a  floating
regime-results  in lower inflation.
Based on our empirical results, however, it is not possible to make any inference about any
particular exchange rate regime being superior to another in terms of  growth performance.
Nonetheless,  empirical  findings  suggest  that  policy  variables-and  also  other  variables
influencing economic activity-do  have different effects on economic growth under different
exchange rate arrangements.
As an additional exercise, we attempt to shed some light on the issue of the appropriate
nominal anchor by drawing on the transition experience (see Appendix 1). A cursory look at the
performance of different nominal anchors suggests that countries that included some form of a
fixed exchange rate regime in their stabilization  packages appear to have been more successful in
curbing  inflation  and  inducing  fiscal  discipline.  Countries  that  adopted  money-based
stabilization programs or intermediate exchange rate arrangements, on the other hand, seem to
have  experienced faster  output recovery  than  countries that  pursued  exchange  rate  based
stabilization programs.  Although these inferences are not conclusive in the absence of a more
regimes overlooks the possibility that countries often utilize interest rates to affect the exchange rate movements-a  point
acknowledged in their paper.  In fact, Calvo and Reinhart (2000a) provide some evidence confirming this phenomenon.
48systematic review that incorporates other relevant factors, they are consistent with previous
studies that conducted more formal investigations. 54
In light of these findings, can one  conclude that a particular exchange rate regime is
superior to other exchange rate arrangements in delivering better macroeconomic outcomes in
transition economies?  As is widely recognized, there is no single exchange rate regime that is
best for all countries, at all times, in all circumstances. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that
fixed regimes, after controlling for other relevant factors affecting inflation, do deliver lower
inflation. This finding lends support to those who argue that the credibility associated with fixed
regimes helps policy makers achieve lower inflation outcomes.
Our results also suggest that commitment can be useful even if devaluations happen from
time to time.  Although experience has shown that few countries manage to keep exchanges rates
fixed for very long periods [Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)], this does not necessarily mean that
fixed exchange rates are a bad idea.  By contrast, an unlimited commitment to a fixed rate may
be harmful, since it means that one may have to  endure the consequences of severe shocks
without any accommodation.  Consequently, policy makers'  success in  countries with fixed
regimes will hinge, inter alia, on their ability to address a challenging policy issue: the optimal
level of commitment.
54 See, for instance, Sahay and Vegh (1996).
49Appendix 1:Exchange  Rate Versus Money Based Stabilization:
A Cursory Look at the Transition Experience
The Southern Cone stabilization programs of the 1970s have stimulated much debate as to
whether money or  the exchange rate provides a  better nominal  anchor.55  The outcome of
Southern Cone programs has, indeed, come to be associated with the expression of "recession
now versus recession later".  More precisely, it is argued that  in the case of money based
stabilization the output costs are paid in  up front, while in  the case of exchange rate base
stabilization the costs paid at a later stage.  In light of rather disappointing outcome of a large
number of programs with a single anchor, some observers contended that a single anchor may
not be sufficient to achieve rapid disinflation due to lack of credibility, backward indexation, and
non-synchronized price setting.  As a result, the adoption of additional nominal anchors such as
incomes policy was employed in the programs of the mid-1980s in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, and
Mexico.
Table Al summarizes the key empirical regularities associated with stabilization programs
with different anchors. 56 In addition to the common characteristics associated with the adoption
of a particular anchor (Table 2), the existence of a widespread phenomenon in many developing
(and also in transition countries), namely currency substitution, also plays an important role in
the selection of the appropriate nominal anchor. If the elasticity of substitution between foreign
and domestic currency is very high, then the system may lack a nominal anchor under flexible
exchange rates.  Thus, ceteris paribus, the presence of currency substitution makes the exchange
rate more suitable as the nominal anchor.
55  See, for instance, Vegh (1992), and Calvo and Vegh (1999,1993, 1994).
56  The sample consists of 11 major programs in Latin America and Israel.
50The  issue of the appropriate anchor for the stabilization in  transition economies also
received a lot of attention at the outset of the transition process during the early 1990s. It was
argued that freeing wages and prices simultaneously in transition economies could leave them
without any nominal anchors. 57 Consequently, unless new anchors such as the exchange rate
and money are successfully put  in place, large scale liberalization can be  destabilizing.  In
recognition of this potential threat, stabilization program of many transition countries relied on
two nominal anchors, namely money or the exchange rate, and wages.
Table Al. The Main Empirical Regularities of Stabilization Programs
Exchange Rate Based Stabilization  Money Based Stabilization
Slow convergence of inflation to the rate of devaluation  Slow  convergence of  inflation  to the  rate  of  money
growth
Real appreciation of the domestic currency  Real appreciation of the domestic currency
Deterioration of the trade balance and the current account  No clear-cut response in the trade balance and current
account
Initial  increase  in  real  activity  (i.e.,  real  private  Initial contraction in economic activity
consumption and real GDP) followed by a later contraction
Ambiguous  response of domestic real interest rates  Initial increase in domestic real interest rates
Source: Calvo and Vegh (1994)
Did transition countries with different anchors have significantly different experience in
terms of lowering inflation and output loss associated with their adoption?  Although providing
an answer to this question through a formal analysis is beyond the scope of this section, Table
A2-drawing  on  the  existing  literature-attempts  to  summarize the  main  advantages and
drawbacks of money and exchange rate based stabilizations in the context of transition countries.
57 Sahay and Vegh (1996).
51Table A2. The Choice of the Nominal Anchor in the Transition Process: Fixed Versus
Flexible
Selection Criteria  Fixed  Flexible  Tentative Conclusion
The  costs  of stabilization  while  Money  demand  shocks  have  Money  demand  shocks  have  It is difficult  to detennine  a priori  which type
the  program  is in  place  smaller consequences  for output,  larger  consequences  for output,  of shock  will dominate.  In the face of  sharp
while  that of real shocks  are  while  in the face of real shocks  contractions  due to structural  change  and
magnified.  has better  output stabilizing  political  developments,  the added  output
properties  losses  associated  with the  particular  anchor
will be a less significant  consideration  in
determining  the  choice of  nominal  anchor.
The effectiveness  of the  In the face of shifts  in money  Money  based  stabilization  will  At first blush,  the fact  that the situation  of
approach  in lowering  inflation  demand  and unstable  velocity,  be more effective  if: (i) money  transition  economies  can be characterized  by
an exchange  rate peg provides  a  demand  is stable  and (ii) money  shifts in money  demand  and unstable
better anchor  and thus may  be  is more closely  linked  to the  velocity  suggests  that exchange  rate anchors
more effective  in controlling  price level.  may  seem to be more effective. However,  it
inflation.  should  be noted  that the objective  of
lowering  inflation  from very high levels  to
moderate  levels  is very different  from
achieving  narrowly  defined low  inflation
targets. Thus, the  laxity in inflationary
control  associated  with monetary  anchor
may  be of secondary  importance.  The
success  of several  money  based stabilization
programs  in transition  economies,  e.g.
Albania,  Slovenia,  Latvia, and Lithuania,  is a
case in point.
The  costs resultingfrom  the  The costs  of failure  may  be  If the  public  is perceived  as  Lack of credibility  is more disruptive  under
program failre  higher in the case of exchange  highly  skeptical,  a money based  fixed exchange  regime than under monetary
rate based stabilization.  The  stabilization  can be less  risky.  anchor.  If the credibility  is high,  the
reputational  cost to the  The lack of success  in meeting  exchange  rate should  probably  be favored  as
govemment  is likely  to be higher  monetary  targets  may  be  it allows  for a faster  adjustment  of  real
in the aftermath  of  the collapse  perceived  less explicitly  as a  money  balances.
of the peg.  failure  of the  govemment  than
the forced  floating  of the
currency  or a sharp devaluation.
The  chances  offailure and the  The public  observability  of the  Money  based stabilization  may  The commnitment  to an exchange  rate is only
conditions  that would  minimize  exchange  rate may  enhance  the  be desirable  if (i) the  underlying  one of the factors  likely to affect fiscal
the risk offailure  credibility  of an exchange  rate  commitment  of  policy  makers  to  discipline. A fixed  exchange  rate
based  approach. To the extent  fiscal  discipline,  that is the  arrangement  may  strengthen  the
that the  undesirable  exogenous  preferences  of policy  determination  for fiscal adjustment,  though  it
consequences  of  failure  act as a  makers  as opposed  to the actual  is unlikely  to produce  political  mtiracles.
deterrent to dropping the  behavior ofpolicy  makers, is
program,  it may  lead to a higher  deemed  incompatible  with the
commitment  to pursue  the  exchange  rate as a nominal
required  accompanying  anchor  and (ii) the  risk of
stabilization  measures,  fiscal  advese shocks,  which are
adjustment  in particular.  beyond  the authorities'  control  is
high.
In light of Table A2, three comments are in order.  First, standard policy advice promoted
the exchange rate as the nominal anchor in lieu of money was the instability of demand for
money  during  transition,  which,  in  turn,  would  make  setting  monetary  targets  difficult.
Furthermore, it was argued monetary based stabilization had  the danger of Dornbusch-style
exchange rate overshooting (Fischer 1986).  Nonetheless, when the magnitude of the fiscal
deficit  rendered  substantial  monetization  unavoidable, pegging  exchange  rates  had  little
52credibility.  It  was argued that under such circumstances, there was a  little alternative to  a
floating exchange rate, and monetary targets would have to do the best they could. In a nutshell,
for more optimistic cases exchange rate  was recommended to  be  employed as the nominal
anchor, however, where the fundamentals were more problematic money based stabilization was
favored.
Second, despite the often claimed problem of instability of  demand for money, some
studies showed that one can estimate a reasonably good demand equation for M2 using a panel
of  quarterly  data for  13 countries. 58 Many  analysts, however,  considered the  noticeable
uncertainties about real output and prices during early transition as a valid argument against the
use of monetary targeting. Although this conjecture appears to have provided some support for
the advice to favor exchange rate based stabilization  where possible, one should acknowledge the
success of several money based stabilization programs in spite of the documented instability of
velocity. 59
Third, an important issue associated with pegging the exchange rate was the implicit rule
for  subsequent re-alignments.  This  hinged  both  on  inflation  differential and  changes in
equilibrium exchange rate  induced by differential productivity growth at home and abroad,
which  led  to  the  following  question:  is  productivity  growth  more predictable  than  the
fluctuations in real money demand? Begg (1997) argued that productivity growth is likely to be
more predictable than the gyrations in real money demand due to drastic changes in financial
structure and/or currency substitution. He drew a tentative conclusion that exchange rate pegs,
58 See, for instance, Begg (1996).
59 The widely quoted successful money based stabilization programs in Albania, Slovenia, Latvia, and Lithuania had three
important common characteristics:  (i) nominal target that tumed inappropriate  were simply adjusted ex post; (ii) multiple nominal
anchors were employed;  and (iii) for any nominal anchor, fiscal discipline mattered even more.
53although with regular alignments, may provide a more reliable basis for navigation during initial
stabilization  period so long as prudent fiscal and monetary policies are pursued.
What are the stylized facts concerning the performnance  of different anchors that can be
gleaned from a cursory look at the available data?  Drawing upon Fischer and Sahay (2000) in
determining the dates of stabilization programs, Table A3 and Table A4 present a summary of
some stylized facts under alternative anchors. Table A3 includes only first stabilization attempts
and excludes those countries that switch their anchors to avoid the survival bias.  Table A4, on
the other hand, contains  both first and second attempts to stabilize but excludes those countries
that switch their anchors once they achieve stabilization. Both tables report the evolution of the
mean and median of key macro variables under different anchors since the introduction of the
stabilization  program (t=0).
54Table A3. Evolution of Key Macro Variables Under Different Anchorsa
t=O  t=l  t=2  t=3  t=4
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median
Inflationb
Fixed  0.50  0.34  0.21  0.24  0.21  0.19  0.15  0.14  0.11  0.10
(3)c  (3)  (3)  (3)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)
Intermediate  0.61  0.60  0.22  0.19  0.16  0.10  0.25  0.17  0.11  0.08
(6)  (6)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (3)  (3)
Floating  0.61  0.70  0.30  0.25  0.20  0.19  0.12  0.06  0.18  0.15
(I11)  (I11)  (10)  (10)  (8)  (8)  (5)  (5)  (3)  (3)
Budget  Balance
Fixed  -0.47  -0.30  -2.50  -3.10  -3.20  -3.25  -3.15  -1.30  -3.03  -1.85
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)
Intermediate  -3.31  -3.69  -3.72  -3.20  -3.86  -3.80  -2.57  -2.70  -1.67  -1.70
(6)  (6)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (3)  (3)
Floating  -6.74  -6.20  -5.70  -4.25  -6.30  -5.30  -6.60  -5.80  -8.67  -7.50
(10)  (10)  (10)  (10)  (8)  (8)  (5)  (5)  (3)  (3)
GDP  Growth
Fixed  -9.73  -9.77  -8.06  -9.00  -2.04  -2.53  2.96  3.75  5.04  5.15
(3)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)  (4)
Intermediate  -5.27  4.82  -0.79  -1.20  3.96  2.63  2.04  2.90  3.90  3.50
(6)  (6)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (7)  (3)  (3)
Floating  -11.51  -11.8  -4.58  -5.14  1.75  1.85  5.86  7.20  0.87  2.10
(I11)  (1  1)  (10)  (10)  (8)  (8)  (5)  (5)  (3)  (3)
a: The sample consists of the following countries: Albania (1992-98), Armenia (1995-98), Azerbaijan (1995-98), Belarus (1995-
98), Bulgaria (1991-96), Croatia (1994-98), Czech Republic (1991-95), Estonia (1992-98), Georgia (1995-98), Hungary (1990-
94), Kazakstan (1994-96), Kyrgyz Republic (1993-94), Latvia (1992-94), Lithuania (1992-93), Macedonia (1994-98), Moldova
(1994-98), Poland (1991-98), Romania (1994-96), Russia (1995-98), Slovak Republic  (1993-98), Slovenia (1992-98), and
Ukraine (1995-98).
b: To reduce the importance of outliers, the inflation rate (r) is transformed to: n/(1 +ir).
c: Figures in parentheses denote number of observations.
On balance, countries that  adopted exchange rate based  stabilization or  intermediate
exchange rate arrangements appear to have been more successful in bringing inflation down
compared to countries that employed money-based stabilization programs (Tables A3 and A4).
The same observation also applies to lowering  fiscal deficit.  In terms of output recovery-or
output costs of a particular anchor adopted-countries  that adopted intermediate exchange rate
55arrangements  or implemented  money-based stabilization  programs seem to have fared better than
countries that pursued exchange rate based stabilization  program.
Table A4. Evolution of Key Macro Variables Under Different Anchorsa
t=O  tP1  t=2  t=3  t=4
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median
Inflationb
Fixed  0.53  0.34  0.18  0.24  0.19  0.18  0.13  0.10  0.09  0.07
(5)C  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)
Intennediate  0.51  0.56  0.22  0.22  0.14  0.10  0.22  0.15  0.11  0.08
(9)  (9)  (10)  (10)  (9)  (9)  (9)  (9)  (3)  (3)
Floating  0.61  0.70  0.30  0.25  0.20  0.19  0.12  0.06  0.18  0.15
(11)  (11)  (10)  (10)  (8)  (8)  (5)  (5)  (3)  (3)
Budget Balance
Fixed  -1.98  -1.90  -2.20  -3.10  -3.46  -4.50  -2.88  -1.30  -3.62  -1.90
(5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)
Intermediate  -4.62  -3.60  -3.93  -3.25  4.15  -3.80  -2.83  -2.70  -1.67  -1.70
(9)  (9)  (10)  (10)  (9)  (9)  (9)  (9)  (3)  (3)
Floating  -6.74  -6.20  -5.70  -4.25  -6.30  -5.30  -6.60  -5.80  -8.67  -7.50
(10)  (10)  (10)  (10)  (8)  (8)  (5)  (5)  (3)  (3)
GDP  Growth
Fixed  -9.18  -9.77  -3.48  -3.30  -0.68  -2.00  3.83  4.30  5.05  5.10
(5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)  (5)
Intermediate  -4.09  -5.4  0.20  0.80  4.90  5.30  2.04  2.30  3.90  3.50
(9)  (9)  (10)  (10)  (9)  (9)  (9)  (9)  (3)  (3)
Floating  -11.51  -11.8  -4.58  -5.14  1.75  1.85  5.86  7.20  0.87  2.10
(11)  (11)  (10)  (10)  (8)  (8)  (5)  (5)  (3)  (3)
a: The sample  consists  of Albania  (1992-98),  Armenia  (1995-98),  Azerbaijan  (1995-98),  Belarus  (1995-98),  Bulgaria(1991-96
and 1997-98),  Croatia (1994-98),  Czech Republic  (1991-95),  Estonia (1992-98),  Georgia (1995-98),  Hungary  (1990-94),
Kazakstan  (1994-96),  Kyrgyz Republic (1993-94  and  1995-98),  Latvia (1992-94), Lithuania (1992-1993  and  1994-98),
Macedonia  (1994-98),  Moldova  (1994-98),  Poland (1991-98),  Romania  (1994-96  and 1997-98),  Russia (1995-98),  Slovak
Republic  (1993-98),  Slovenia  (1992-98),  and  Ukraine  (1995-98).
b: To  reduce  the importance  of outliers,  the inflation  rate (n) is transformed  to:  nt/(l+7n).
c: Figures  in parentheses  denote  number  of observations.
In  short, countries that  included  some  form  of  fixed exchange  rate  regime  in  their
stabilization packages appear to have been more successful in curbing inflation and inducing
fiscal discipline.  Countries that adopted money based stabilization programs or  internediate
exchange rate arrangements, on the other hand, seem to have experienced faster output recovery
56than countries that pursued exchange rate based stabilization programs.  Clearly, since these
inferences are based on stylized facts without a systematic review that considers other relevant
factors, they cannot be deemed as conclusive conjectures. Nonetheless, a more formal treatment
of the issue at hand also seems to reach a similar conclusion: the exchange rate has been more
effective than money as nominal anchor in reducing inflation in transition to a market economy
[Sahay and Vegh (1996)].
57Appendix 2: Extension of the Heckman Procedure for three Regimes
Heckman (1979) derives the correct asymptotic variance-covariance (VC) matrix in the
two-stage  procedure for the case of two regimes. In the context of our paper, his formulas can be
applied to  the first and the third regimes.  However, for the second regime it needs some
modification since the probability the regime is calculated on the basis of two constants (limit
points).  In  this  Appendix,  we,  consistent with  Heckman's  (1979)  notation,  modify the
asymptotic  VC matrix in the two-stage procedure for the second regime.
We, first, derive the estimate for the variance of the disturbance term, u2. Rewriting (5) in
Section 6 yields to:
E(uj, I  ZiY  <  vi <  Zr +  a) =  a2 v  f(C)  - F(cO)  =  2,h3
F(c2)- F(c.)
where c,=Zy+a- and c2=  Zy+a2. Then, the expression for variance of e22i  can be written as:
E(e22)  =2  _2h  cf(c)  - c 2f  (c)1 F(c 2) -F(c.)J
Therefore, the expression for the estimated variance is
2  2  A2  j
2 12  [  2  ^  Vf( 0 1)  - 62 J(V 21)1
°-2  =_-jV2r+  j  ki  2  >  F'  '
12  1  12  l  FC2J-F(61i)
where  h2,  - F  )  ,  =  ZaY-+  &,,  c2 U  =  Zi  t  + a2,  e2, are residuals obtained from the
second step Heckman procedure along with  62&,  , ,  &2and  y  are coming from the ordered
probit regression in the first stage, 12  is the number of observations in the second regime.
Next, we derive the assymptotic VC matrix of the estimated  parameters. Drawing on
Heckman (1979), we can write:
40  2  02  )4N(O, B WV), where
58B=piimIX 2 I  X2 X2h  =  milxx 2 X  j2 B =  plimI2(  22  ,2)=plimI2(  2  2)
I,I2  -OD  k2X2  ^2k  lkZe  ^X2  h2h2
Y  =  p  1im( 1 +  2) 1,1,  4C0
=  a2  (XV X  Xi  hj)
it  hiX2i  h 2 i2 
0  C22vE  L  X2iX2j'  X2i2jS
II,  kh 2 X2j  h21h2 1)
E 2 2  cbf(c  f()2- Ee22  U22  2_  Clif(Cli)-ci(2)
7i  =  C2  = 1  4 2
- F(c 2j) - F(c1 i)
a~~~k  akh2Z  Ahi8210  Dh2j  Z  ah2jf{h2A
Laa, aa2\ ay  J  L  O;  aa2c  ar'
Oh 2,  (c21)  (h 2 ,  -CA2 la 2 F(C2 1 ) - F(cl 1 )  -
-k  i  c1 f(c2i) - hc 2 if(c 2 i)
Oac 2 F(c21) - F(c li )
aha,  _ /2_  c1jf(c2,)  - c2 f(c 2i)
ar  F(C21)-F(cli)
In the above expressions Q is a variance-covariance matrix of (&i &2  ,r),  I is the total
number of observations. Expression in square brackets is a stacked vector.
59Appendix 3: Simulation Exercise
In the simulation exercise, we place the values of right hand side variables of one regime
into the structural equation of another. The resulting value would be the expected inflation if the
country were to run the other regime.  It should be kept in mind that when conducting this kind
of simulations the tern  associated with the covariance in the simulated equation should be
substituted by the corresponding term from the original equation. For instance, if we were to
simulate intermediate countries to  find our how they would perform under  fix regime, the
original equations for fix and intermediate  regimes are the following:
E(Yj  I  Xi, Zi, fix) = XAh,  - ,  (Z,i +  al,)
E(Yj  X,  Zj,interm.) = XjB2 +  5 2 ,  f(Zj  +a,)-f(Zj9+  2)
F(Zj  +  &2) -F(Z1jp+  t,)
where observations denoted by the notation i represent fix regimes, while those withj  stand for
intermediate arrangements. Now, we substitute the intermediate observations into the equation
for fix and obtain the simulated inflation from the following equation:
kE(Yj  I Xj,Zj,fix)  =  XjBI  - vFZ  +a)-(Zj+a
Note that after covariance, we have a term from coming form the original equation for
intermediate regime. Substituting only Zj into the "fix" equation would be incorrect.
Finally, from the last expression, we obtain the expected values of inflation or growth if a
country under intermediate regime were to run fix.
60Appendix  4: Description  of Data
Data on GDP growth, inflation, budget deficit are obtained from various EBRD reports.
Data on international reserves and monetary base were taken from IFS.  Unfortunately, for the
majority  of  transition  countries  financial  statistics  in  the  beginning  of  transition  were
unavailable.  Consequently, those observations could not be included in the regression analysis.
Liberalization indices are taken from De Melo et al and updated for 1998 from the EBRD report.
Classification of  the exchange  rate  regimes is  obtained from  the  IMF's  Exchange  Rate
Arrangements  and Exchange Rate Restrictions.
Moreover, observations corresponding to the year 1997 for Bulgaria were excluded on the
grounds that Bulgaria accepted currency board in the middle of the year while experiencing
extremely high  inflation prior to the month and,  as a result, for the entire year. Since this
particular year, 1997, would be treated as a fixed regime in the annual data, it would become an
obvious outlier.
We also excluded years of war and  severe regional conflicts involving the  following
countries: Armnenia,  Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Macedonia, Croatia.  In addition, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were excluded from the sample due to  data problems.  Time
period for Czech Republic and Slovak republic was considered after they separated to avoid
inconsistency in the data.
The countries and the periods for the regression analysis are the followings: Albania 1993-
98, Armenia 1995-98, Azerbaijan 1995-98,  Belarus 1995-98,  Bulgaria 1995-98, Croatia 1995-98,
Czech Republic  1994-97, Estonia 1993-98, Georgia 1994-98, Hungary  1992-98, Kazakhstan
1994-98, Kyrgyz Republic 1994-98, Latvia 1994-98, Lithuania 1994-98, Macedonia 1996-98,
Moldova 1993-98, Poland 1992-98, Romania 1992-98, Russia 1995-98, Slovak Republic 1994-
98, Slovenia 1993-98,  and Ukraine 1994-98.
The series employed in the regression analysis contains 24, 54, and 35 observations under
fixed, intermediate, and floating regimes, respectively.
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